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WARRANTLESS AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND THE




The black-mustachio'd face gazed down from every com-
manding corner .... BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING
YOU, the caption said.... In the far distance a helicopter
skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for an instant
like a blue-bottle, and darted away again with a curving
flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people's
windows.'
W HILE GEORGE ORWELL contemplated the realities
of aerial surveillance, the framers of the Constitution
clearly did not.2 Helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft allow
government officials to see, hear, and search in a manner
far beyond the imagination of the Constitution's framers.'
Nevertheless, the fundamental principle embodied in the
B.A., Baylor University, 1987; J.D., Southern Methodist University, 1990.
Mr. Foster is an associate with the firm of Locke Purnell Rain Harrell, Dallas,
Texas.
G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 6 (1949); see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445, 466 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (plurality upheld helicopter surveillance
of curtilage; Justice Brennan quoted this passage and remarked, "I hope it will be
a matter of concern to my colleagues that the police surveillance methods they
would sanction were among those described forty years ago in George Orwell's
dread vision of life in the 1980's.").
2 Helicopter surveillance of the type described by Mr. Orwell is a phenomenon
of relatively recent origin. The first use of a helicopter in police work was in New
York in 1947. Currently, police departments in all fifty states use helicopters. See
Riley, 488 U.S. at 450 n.2.
Cf Comment, Plane View Doctrine? Private Aircraft Searches, 55J. AIR L. & Com.
443, 447 (1989).
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fourth amendment, 4 the belief that individuals in our soci-
ety should be able to "dwell in reasonable security and
freedom from government intrusions,"' 5 remains the
benchmark in determining whether a particular govern-
mental activity is unconstitutional. The essence of a
fourth amendment violation is not the method of govern-
mental intrusion; it is the "invasion of [an] indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property. 6
Not surprisingly, courts have struggled in the attempt
to apply broad fourth amendment principles to new tech-
nology.7 Justice Frankfurter once noted, "The course of
true law pertaining to searches and seizures ... has not
... run smooth."" The prospect of warrantless aerial sur-
veillance raises particularly troublesome and controversial
issues. The Supreme Court attempted to address these
issues in a trio of recent decisions. In Dow Chemical Co. v.
The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For a comprehensive overview of fourth amendment ju-
risprudence, see W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT (1978 & Supp. 1986); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
5Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); see also Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ("The basic purpose of the [the Fourth] Amend-
ment .. .is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by government officials. The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete
expression to a right of the people which 'is basic to a free society.' ").
7 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (electronic
"beeper" placed on an automobile does not violate fourth amendment); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (use of pen registers to record telephone
numbers dialed from a particular phone does not violate fourth amendment);
State v. DeLaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (warrantless police interception of a
cordless telephone conversation does not violate fourth amendment).
, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurt, J., concur-
ring); see also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
349 (1974) ("For clarity and consistency the law of the fourth amendment is not
the Supreme Court's most successful product.").
FOURTH AMENDMENT
United States,9 the Court held that the use of an aerial map-
ping camera to photograph an industrial manufacturing
complex from navigable airspace did not require a war-
rant under the fourth amendment. The Court reasoned
that the complex was more comparable to an open field
than it was to the curtilage of a home, which is generally
afforded more protection against invasions of privacy.' °
In the companion case of California v. Ciraolo," however,
the Court ignored this distinction and held that the obser-
vation by a police officer of a fenced-in backyard within
the curtilage of a home from a fixed-wing aircraft flying at
an altitude of 1000 feet did not violate the fourth amend-
ment rights of the homeowner. Finally, in Florida v.
Riley,' 2 the Court held that the observation of the interior
of a partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard
by a police officer circling four hundred feet over the
home did not constitute a "search" within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.
In each of these cases, the Court did more than simply
determine that the fourth amendment had not been vio-
lated. It also held that since these overflights did not con-
stitute "searches" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, the amendment did not even apply. This ar-
ticle will examine whether and to what extent the fourth
9 476 U.S. 227 (1986). For a discussion of Dow, see infra notes 60-82 and ac-
companying text.
10 Id. at 239. In Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984), the Supreme
Court held that "an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities
conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the
home." The court reasoned that "open fields do not provide the setting for those
intimate activities that the [Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from gov-
ernmental interference or surveillance." Id. at 179. However, the curtilage [the
area intimately surrounding a home] generally receives greater protection be-
cause it is "intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically,
where privacy expectations are most heightened." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 213 (1986). The curtilage, unlike an open field, is intimately associated with
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
For a more detailed discussion of the curtilage, see infra note 23.
1, 476 U.S. at 207. For a discussion of Ciraolo, see infra notes 83-105 and ac-
companying text.
12 488 U.S. at 445. For a discussion of Riley, see infra notes 106-151 and accom-
panying text.
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amendment imposes any limitations on aerial surveillance
by law enforcement officials. In doing so, it will specifi-
cally address the following: (1) the history of the fourth
amendment right to privacy; (2) the decisions of the
Supreme Court with respect to aerial surveillance; (3) the
Court's apparent abandonment of traditional fourth
amendment privacy rights in aerial surveillance cases; and
(4) a proposal that search warrants be required in order
for government officials to invade privacy interests
through aerial surveillance.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. Pre-Katz Era
The first significant case to comment on the fourth
amendment was handed down by the Supreme Court in
1886. In Boyd v. United States,13 the Court "created an ab-
solute zone of privacy . . . into which the government
could not enter."'14 In his opinion for the Court, Justice
Bradley held that the fourth amendment applied "to all
invasions on the part of the government and its employ-
ees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life."15
13 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
14 Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment
in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 652
(1988).
15 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. The passage of the fourth amendment was motivated
by the British government's abuse of writs of assistance in the colonies. See Stea-
gald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981); Note, Criminal Procedure - Search
and Seizure - California v. Ciraolo, 53 J. AIR L. & CoM. 291, 292-93 & n. I1 (1987); see
also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 608-09 (1979) (White,J., dissenting); Stan-
ford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1964). See generally N. LASSON, supra note 4,
at 137-78 (describing the British government's use of writs of assistance in the
colonies, specifically in the context of smuggled goods and the role of this use as a
precursor of the American Revolution). Writs of assistance noted only the object
of the search and left officials free to search wherever they suspected that the
object was located. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 220. The Boyd court noted:
Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were
those general warrants known as writs of assistance under which of-
ficers of the Crown had so much bedeviled the colonists. The hated
writs of assistance ... were denounced by James Otis as "the worst
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English lib-
[56
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Boyd involved a civil forfeiture proceeding for failure to
pay taxes on imported goods.' 6  The government ob-
tained a court order requiring the Boyds to produce cer-
tain papers related to the charge against them. The
Boyds complied but, nevertheless, argued that the order
was unconstitutional.' 7 The Supreme Court agreed, hold-
ing that the fourth and fifth amendments were both vio-
lated in this case, even though the government did not
actually search the Boyds' possessions and seize the
documents. la
The Court reasoned that the manner in which the infor-
mation was obtained was irrelevant, stating that "[i]t is
not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it
is the invasion of his indefeasible right" to privacy.' 9 The
Court thus couched the fourth amendment in broad,
"value-oriented" language. 20 The focus was not upon the
erty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in
an English law book," because they placed "the liberty of every man
in the hands of every petty officer."
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 625.
w Boyd, 116 U.S. at 617.
7 id. at 617-18.
is Id. at 630. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Miller argued that be-
cause there had been no search or seizure, the fourth amendment had not been
violated. Rather, the compelled production of the documents violated only the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 641 (Miller, J.,
concurring).
,9 Id. at 630. While the ideas expressed in Boyd concerning the intimate rela-
tionship between the fourth and fifth amendments still receive support, see Gutter-
man, supra note 14, at 652 n.21; Note, Formalism, Legal Realism and Constitutionally
Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1977),
the absolute protection for personal papers given in Boyd has eroded over time.
Gutterman, supra note 14, at 652 n.21; see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S 463
(1976) (government can lawfully seize business records pursuant to a warrant);
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (contents of voluntarily created busi-
ness records are not protected from subpoenas; however, act of producing docu-
ments may constitute testimonial self-incrimination); see also Note, The Life and
Times of Boydv. United States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184 (1977). Neverthe-
less, one author concluded that Boyd "remains the touchstone of the Court's
fourth amendment jurisprudence." Gutterman, supra note 14, at 654.
2o Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 ("The principles laid down in this opinion affect the
very essence of constitutional liberty and security."); see Gutterman, supra note 14,
at 654.
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means of encroaching upon personal privacy, but upon
the right to privacy itself.
The Supreme Court subsequently began to base fourth
amendment decisions involving unreasonable searches
and seizures on the question of whether there had been a
physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area.2
While an invasion of the home22 or curtilage 23 was clearly
unreasonable, a search for illegal evidence in an area
2, See Note, In Plane View: Is Aerial Surveillance a Violation of the Fourth Amendment?
California v. Ciraolo, 40 Sw. LJ. 1133, 1134-35 (1986).
22 See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 211 ("[W]e have consistently held that the entry into
a home to conduct a search ... is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
unless done pursuant to a warrant."); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
511 (1961) ("At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable govern-
ment intrusion."). The protection afforded the home under the fourth amend-
ment has been extended to other residential premises as well. See, e.g., Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967) (fourth amendment protection ex-
tends to apartments); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (guest in
hotel room entitled to fourth amendment protection); McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (fourth amendment protects against unreasonable
search of rooms in boarding house); see also Note, supra note 15, at 294-95.
23 The "curtilage" has been defined as "a small court, yard, girth, or piece of
ground attached to a dwelling house, and forming one enclosure with it, or so
regarded by law; the area attached to and containing a dwelling house and its out-
building." 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1278 (1933). In Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), the Supreme Court observed that "for most homes,
the boundaries of the curtilage will be clearly marked; and the conception defin-
ing the curtilage - as the area around the home to which the activity of home life
extends - is a familiar one easily understood from our daily experience." Id. at
182 n.12.
For fourth amendment purposes, the curtilage "has been considered part of the
home itself." Id. at 180. Courts have generally looked at several factors in deter-
mining whether an area searched was located within the curtilage, including "the
proximity between the area claimed to be curtilage and the home, the nature of
the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the
area from observation from people passing by." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 221 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S.
1, 5 (1931) (garage is within curtilage); United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992,
993 (4th Cir. 1981) (honeysuckle patch located 150 feet from house but contained
within fence was part of curtilage); Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853,
858 (9th Cir. 1968) (trees located 30 feet from house were within curtilage);
Walker v. United States, 225 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1955) (barn 70 yards from
house was within curtilage). But see, United States ex rel. Saiken v. Bensinger, 546
F.2d 1292, 1297 (7th Cir. 1976) (goose house 400 feet from home was not within
curtilage); Brock v. United States, 256 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir. 1958) (building lo-
cated 150-180 feet from home and separated from the home by a fence was not
within curtilage); Hodges v. United States, 243 F.2d 281, 282-83 (5th Cir. 1957)
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which was not traditionally protected was held not to vio-
late the fourth amendment. In Hester v. United States,24 the
Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of a field by
federal revenue officers in order to locate two jugs of ille-
gal whiskey. The Court held that the fourth amendment's
protection of "persons, houses, papers, and effects" did
not extend to open fields.25
Initially, the Court applied the same analysis to cases
involving developments in technology which allowed in-
trusion into constitutionally protected areas without phys-
ical trespass. As a result, as law enforcement technology
advanced, the scope of fourth amendment protections
correspondingly narrowed. In Olmstead v. United States,2 6
Chief Justice Taft, greatly influenced by a concern for law
and order, held that the wiretapping of telephone conver-
sations did not constitute a search or seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. 27 In a significant de-
parture from the language of Boyd, the Court concluded
that the spoken words were not "material things" which
could be "seized" under the amendment.2 8 Further, the
Court indicated that a physical trespass into a constitu-
tionally protected area was necessary to constitute an un-
reasonable "search." 29
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that the
heart of the fourth amendment was the privacy of the indi-
vidual.3 0 He felt that the amendment conferred "the right
(chicken house 150 feet from residence and separated from it by two fences was
not within curtilage); see also Note, supra note 15, at 293 & n.12.
'4 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
5 Id. at 59.
26 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
27 Id. at 464; see Gutterman, supra note 14, at 657.
2a Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464 ("The Amendment itself shows that the search is to
be of material things.").
Id. at 466.
30 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis stated:
The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is [broad] in scope.
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
1991] 725
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to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men."'" He urged the
Court to focus on these values in reaching its decisions,
rather than the means used by the government to invade
personal privacy.3 Finally, he speculated that under this
decision, technological developments might eventually
enable the government, without physical trespass, to ex-
pose the most intimate occurrences within a home."3
Brandeis lamented, "Can it be that the Constitution af-
fords no protection against such invasions of individual
security?" 4
As the sophistication of electronic listening devices
steadily increased, the Supreme Court slowly recognized
that the trespass doctrine set forth in Olmstead was not ten-
able. 5 The Court reaffirmed Olmstead in Goldman v. United
States,3 6 holding that a listening device placed against the
wall and used to monitor conversations in the next room
did not violate the fourth amendment because there was
no physical trespass. It refused, however, to go "even a
fraction of an inch" beyond Goldman.s By 1967, the
Court was ready to abandon the Olmstead approach
altogether.
life are to found in material things. They sought to protect Ameri-




3 Id. ("[Elvery unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of
the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.").
33 Id. at 474.
4 Id.
35 Gutterman, supra note 14, at 659.
36 316 U.S. 129 (1942); see also Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (fed-
eral agent's use of concealed microphone to tape incriminating conversations on
petitioner's property did not violate the fourth amendment because there was no
unauthorized trespass into a constitutionally protected area).
.17 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512 (minor penetration of a "spike mike" into a wall
constituted trespass which triggered the fourth amendment).
[56
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B. Katz v. United States
In Katz v. United States,38 the Supreme Court handed
down a decision which has become the touchstone of
fourth amendment analysis.3 9 The Katz court discarded
the property-based approach of Olmstead and adopted a
privacy-based approach, declaring that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." 40 While Katz is
generally regarded as the cornerstone of the "new"
fourth amendment, its privacy-oriented approach has its
roots firmly planted in the doctrines first announced in
Boyd.4
In Katz, government officials attached an electronic lis-
tening device to the outside of a public telephone booth
without first obtaining a search warrant. 2 This device was
used to record Katz's conversations% relating to illegal wa-
gering schemes. 3 In holding that the officials' actions did
not comply with fourth amendment standards, the Court
noted that although Katz did not own the phone booth, by
closing the door behind him and paying his toll, he was
certainly entitled to expect that his conversation would be
private.4 4 The Court stated that "[w]hat a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or of-
fice, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected."45
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan refined the ma-
jority's privacy standard. Harlan stated that in determin-
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211.
4o Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
41 See Gutterman, supra note 14, at 662.
42 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 352 ("One who occupies [a phone booth]... is surely entitled to as-
sume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world.").
I4 d. at 351 (citations omitted); see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750
(1971) (fourth amendment does not protect a mistaken belief that a person to
whom a wrongdoer voluntarily makes privy illegal activity will not reveal it).
19911 727
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ing whether to accord fourth amendment protection to a
particular activity, the central inquiry is whether there is a
"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy."' 46 This inquiry breaks down into a two-part test:
(1) whether the individual has a subjective expectation of
privacy; and (2) whether society is willing to recognize
that expectation as reasonable.47 No longer is the fourth
amendment limited to protection against physical tres-
pass; rather, it extends to all areas which a person subjec-
tively and reasonably expects to remain private. Thus, the
conversations of people talking openly in public are not
afforded fourth amendment protection because society
would view any expectation of privacy in these conversa-
tions as unreasonable, even if such an expectation were
subjectively held.48 On the other hand, because the
phone booth in Katz was a temporarily private place where
one could reasonably expect privacy, the fourth amend-
ment protected Katz's conversation, despite the fact that
the phone booth was accessible to the public at other
times .
By couching the Katz test in subjective terms, the Court
fails to recognize that there are any basic rights to which
all persons are entitled.50 A particular activity will only be
given constitutional protection if society considers an ex-
pectation of privacy in that activity to be reasonable.
Moreover, a judicial determination of societal attitudes is
likely to be rather conclusory. 5 1 Fourth amendment cases
are not heard by "society"; they are heard by judges. As
one commentator pointed out, Katz's expectations of pri-
4o Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). While this formula does not
appear in the majority opinion, Justice Harlan's "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" test "has been seized upon, cited repeatedly, and is now generally accepted
as the Katz formula." Gutterman, supra note 14, at 665. The Supreme Court first
used this test in a majority opinion in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
47 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
48 Id.; see Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Modelfor Fourth Amendment Pro-
tection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 593 (1989).
49 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
50 See Gutterman, supra note 14, at 665; Serr, supra note 48, at 593.
5, Serr, supra note 48, at 593.
[56
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vacy were reasonable because Justice Harlan said they
were reasonable.52 Katz thus provides a framework by
which judges can determine for themselves whether cer-
tain expectations of privacy are reasonable and then attri-
bute those expectations to others. 5  For example, in
Oliver v. United States,54 the Court used Katz terminology to
reaffirm the open fields test established in Hester. In Oli-
ver, narcotics officers conducting a warrantless search un-
covered a marijuana patch in an open field. 55 Despite the
fact that the defendant had posted "No Trespassing"
signs around his property, the Court held that the intru-
sion did not constitute an unreasonable search because
"[n]o expectation of privacy legitimately attaches to open
fields."' 56 Thus, the Court concluded that all warrantless
52 Id.
53 See Gutterman, supra note 14, at 666 ("By placing the fourth amendment on
such an indefinite and shifting footing, Justice Harlan laid the foundation for Katz
to be used in the future to restrict the core of privacy embodied in the fourth
amendment."); see also Serr, supra note 48, at 593 ("In subsequent opinions, the
Supreme Court continued to wave Justice Harlan's magic wand without clarifying
what it is that makes an expectation of privacy worthy of fourth amendment pro-
tection."); Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy ": An Emerging Tri-
partite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1089 (1987) (variables arguably relevant in
determining reasonableness of given expectation of privacy are "well-nigh limit-
less").
In a subsequent opinion, Justice Harlan argued that the second prong of the
Katz test should be analyzed by balancing "the nature of a particular practice and
the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security [against] the
utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement." White, 401 U.S. at 786
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan argued that judges should not "merely recite the
expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon
society." Id.
54 466 U.S. 170 (1984). See generally, Comment, Katz in Open Fields, 20 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 485 (1983); Note, The Return to Open Season for Police in the Open Field, 50
Mo. L. REv. 425 (1985); Note, Criminal Procedure, Oliver v. United States: The Open
Fields Doctrine Survives Katz, 63 N.C.L. REV. 546 (1985).
- Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173.
56 Id. at 180. The Court stated:
[Olpen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities
that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government inter-
ference or surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting
the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that
occur in open fields. Moreover, as a practical matter these lands
usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that a
home, an office or commercial structure would not be. It is not gen-
erally true that fences or "No Trespassing" signs effectively bar the
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searches in open fields were per se constitutional.5 1
Furthermore, Katz's "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" test poses something of a dilemma in cases involv-
ing technologically-enhanced surveillance. As
surveillance technology advances, society will gradually
become aware of the increased ability of law enforcement
officials to eavesdrop into people's private lives. For ex-
ample, many people are aware that conversations over
cordless telephones can be intercepted with a transistor
radio. 58  Equipped with this knowledge, people may no
longer subjectively expect their conversations and actions
to remain private. Furthermore, even if an individual sub-
jectively expects to maintain privacy, society may no
longer consider this a reasonable expectation. 59 Can ad-
public from viewing open fields in rural areas. And both petitioner
Oliver and respondent Thornton concede that the public and police
lawfully may survey lands from the air. For these reasons, the as-
serted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that
"society recognizes as reasonable."
Id. at 177 (footnotes omitted).
57 Id. at 180. In dissent, Justice Marshall argued:
Privately owned woods and fields that are not exposed to public view
regularly are employed in a variety of ways that society acknowl-
edges deserve privacy. Many landowners like to take solitary walks
on their property, confident that they will not be confronted in their
rambles by strangers or policemen .... Some landowners use their
secluded spaces to meet lovers, others to gather together with fellow
worshippers, still others to engage in sustained creative endeavor
.... Our respect for the freedom of landowners to use their posted
"open fields" in ways such as these partially explains the seriousness
with which the positive law regards deliberate invasions of such
spaces, and substantially reinforces the landowners' contention that
their expectations of privacy are "reasonable."
Id. at 192-93 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation and footnotes omitted); see also
Note, supra note 15, at 300.
58 See State v. DeLaurier, 488 A.2d 688 (R.I. 1985) (defendant who bought cor-
dless telephone had no justifiable expectation of privacy to protect him from un-
authorized interception of his communications by law enforcement officials who
picked up his conversations on local A.M. radio, when defendant was advised in
owner's manual that, given the nature of cordless telephones, privacy was not in-
sured); see also Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989) cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.
723 (1990) (no reasonable expectation of privacy for conversations over cordless
telephone).
59 Professor Amsterdam has stated:
An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in
a ... theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It can neither
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vances in law enforcement techniques cause fourth
amendment protections to gradually wither away? An
analysis of the Supreme Court decisions in the area of ae-
rial surveillance indicates that, at least until government
actions offend the sensibilities of a majority of the Court,
this may indeed be the case.
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
A. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality
of aerial surveillance in two companion cases handed
down in 1986, Dow Chemical Co. v. United States6' and Cali-
fornia v. Ciraolo.6 1 In Dow, the Court held that the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's (EPA) aerial photography
of Dow Chemical's 2000-acre manufacturing complex
without a warrant did not constitute a search under the
fourth amendment. The Court approved EPA's actions
even though "the finest precision aerial camera available"
allowed the agency to film "a great deal more than the
human eye could ever see. "62
Dow's industrial complex consisted of numerous cov-
ered buildings, with certain manufacturing equipment lo-
cated between the buildings exposed to observation from
the air.63 Dow maintained that it had not concealed this
equipment from aerial surveillance because the costs of
doing so would be prohibitive.' Dow did maintain elabo-
add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to
fourth amendment protection. If it could, the government could di-
minish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by an-
nouncing half-hourly on television that ... we were all forthwith
being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance.
Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 384. Amsterdam argues that the fourth amendment
should protect "those interests that may justifiably claim" protection. Id. at 385.
He notes that while his test may "beg the question," it does so no more than any
other theory the Court has used. Id.
- 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
61 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
62 Dow, 476 U.S. at 230.
- Id. at 229.
64 Id.
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rate security systems which prevented any ground-level
view of these areas.65 It also had a policy of investigating
any low-level flights over the complex.66
After Dow refused to allow EPA to make an on-site in-
spection of its facilities, EPA chose not to seek an adminis-
trative search warrant. Instead, it employed a commercial
aerial photographer, who used a precision aerial mapping
camera to photograph the facility.67 While some of the
photographs were taken from as low as 1200 feet, the air-
craft at all times remained within the navigable airspace. 8
Dow claimed that EPA's action was a search of an "indus-
trial curtilage" for which Dow had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy and, thus, violated the fourth
amendment. 69
In upholding this search, the Court initially noted that a
large industrial complex should not be afforded the same
degree of protection given to the curtilage of a home.
Even though Dow took significant steps to bar access to its
facilities from ground level, the complex was not analo-
gous to a fenced-in backyard. 70 This was not an area im-
mediately adjacent to a home, where privacy expectations
are legitimately heightened; it was a commercial facility,
where the government typically has been given greater
latitude to conduct warrantless inspections. 7' The Court
stated that the intimate activities associated with family
privacy in the home and its curtilage simply do not reach
the outdoor areas surrounding the buildings of a manu-




68 Id.; see 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1990) (fixed-wing aircraft must be operated at an
altitude of at least 1000 feet above the surface when flying over congested areas
and at least 500 feet in other areas).
69 Dow, 476 U.S. at 232-33.
70 See id. at 236.
71 Id. at 238 ("[U]nlike a homeowner's interest in his dwelling, '[t]he interest of
the owner of commercial property is not one in being free from any inspec-
tions.'" (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981)).
72 Id. at 236.
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complex was more comparable to an open field and as
such was open to the view of persons lawfully flying above
the premises.73
The Court further noted that the surveillance equip-
ment was a commercial camera commonly used in map
making, rather than a highly sophisticated device unavail-
able to the public. 4 It noted that anyone with an airplane
and an aerial camera could readily duplicate EPA's photo-
graphs.75 While the Court warned that the use of certain
types of sophisticated surveillance methods, such as satel-
lite technology, may raise constitutional concerns, 76 the
mere fact that human vision is enhanced to some degree
does not raise constitutional problems. 77 The Court con-
cluded that these photographs did not infringe upon any
reasonable expectation of privacy.78
In a separate opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, attacked the majority's
rationale, particularly with respect to the use of the aerial
camera. Powell noted that by basing fourth amendment
limitations on the means of surveillance rather than on
the privacy rights which were invaded, the Court not only
created a distinction previously unknown in fourth
73 Id. at 239; see Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) ("The public
and police lawfully may survey [open fields] from the air.").
74 Dow, 476 U.S. at 231; see Gutterman, supra note 14, at 720.
75 Dow, 476 U.S. at 231. In a partial dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, notes that this camera is indeed quite sophisti-
cated, revealing details as small as one-half inch in diameter. Id. at 251 n. 13 (Pow-
ell,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Further, photographs taken with
this type of camera can be significantly enlarged without loss of acuity. Id. at 250
n.12. Additionally, "members of the public" are not likely to purchase $22,000
aerial mapping cameras. Id. at 251 n.13.
76 Id. at 238 ("It may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of
private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not gener-
ally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally
prescribed absent a warrant.").
77 Id. The court noted, "[An electronic device to penetrate walls or windows
so as to hear and record confidential discussions of chemical formulae or other
trade secrets would raise very different and far more serious questions . I..." d. at
239.
78 Id. at 239 n.5.
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amendment jurisprudence, 79 but also set forth a standard
which would permit the gradual decay of fourth amend-
ment rights as technology advances. 80  He admonished
the Court to rely on the principles laid down in Katz and
focus on whether Dow had a privacy interest that a free
society would recognize as reasonable.8 Finally, Powell
warned that if the Court abandoned Katz in favor of a new
fourth amendment standard based upon the majority
opinion, "privacy rights would be seriously at risk."'82
B. California v. Ciraolo
In California v. Ciraolo,83 the Supreme Court held that
the observation by a police officer of a fenced-in backyard
within the curtilage of a home from a fixed-wing aircraft
was not a "search" under the fourth amendment. Appar-
ently ignoring the distinction it concurrently made in Dow
between the curtilage and open fields, the Court con-
cluded that the homeowner's expectation that his back-
yard was protected from such observation was
unreasonable and was not one that society was prepared
to honor. 84
In Ciraolo, police officers received an anonymous tip
that marijuana was growing in Ciraolo's backyard. Be-
cause Ciraolo had completely enclosed the yard with a 6
79 Id. at 251 n.12. Powell stated:
The only Fourth Amendment limitation on such surveillance under
today's decision apparently is based on the means of surveillance.
The Court holds that Dow had no reasonable expectation of privacy
from surveillance accomplished by means of a $22,000 mapping
camera, but that it does have a reasonable expectation of privacy
from satellite surveillance and photography. This type of distinction
is heretofore wholly unknown in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Id.
80 Id. at 251 ("If the court's observations were to become the basis of a new
Fourth Amendment standard that would replace the rule in Katz, privacy rights
would be seriously at risk as technological advances become generally dissemi-
nated and available in our society.").
8, Id. at 246-47.
82 Id. at 251.
83 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
84 Id. at 213-14.
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foot outer fence and a 10 foot inner fence, the police were
unable to observe the backyard's contents.8 5 Therefore,
they secured an aircraft and flew over the house at an alti-
tude of 1000 feet. Viewing Ciraolo's property in this
manner, the police were able to identify and photograph
marijuana plants growing in the yard. 6 On the basis of
this information, a search warrant was issued for Ciraolo's
home, and 73 marijuana plants were seized.8 7
The State of California argued that because the mari-
juana was visible to the naked eye from aircraft flying
overhead, Ciraolo had knowingly exposed his yard to ae-
rial observation. Ciraolo contended that he had done all
that could reasonably be expected to maintain the privacy
of his garden.88 The California Court of Appeals agreed,
stating that a person "need not construct an opaque bub-
ble over his or her land in order to have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy regarding the activities occurring
there in all circumstances. "8 9
Reversing this decision, the Supreme Court concluded
that the warrantless, naked eye observation of Ciraolo's
private backyard did not implicate the fourth amend-
ment.90 While the Court recognized that the curtilage of a
home has traditionally been carefully protected,9 ' the
fourth amendment has never required absolute protection
'5 Id. at 209.
86 Id.
6 Id. at 209-10.
08 Id. at 211. "Respondent contends he has done all that can reasonably be
expected to tell the world he wishes to maintain the privacy of his garden within
the curtilage without covering his yard. Such covering, he argues, would defeat its
purpose as an outside living area .. " Id.
89 People v. Ciraolo, 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 1090, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, 98 (1984)
(quoting United States v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980)), rev'd sub
nom., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). The California court stated,
"[W]e are not dealing with the observation of an open corn field which also con-
tains a cannabis crop. We are confronted instead with a direct and unauthorized
intrusion into the sanctity of the home." Id., 208 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98.
- Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
91 Id. at 212-13. The Court noted, "The protection afforded the curtilage is
essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately
linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expecta-
tions are most heightened." Id.
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of the home against all police observation.92 The Court
cited Katz for the proposition that "[w]hat a person know-
ingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or of-
fice, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ' 93
In this case, the observations took place within the naviga-
ble airspace in a physically nonintrusive manner.94 In
fact, any member of the public who happened to be flying
overhead could have glanced down and observed
Ciraolo's garden. The Court concluded that Ciraolo's ex-
pectation of privacy was not one that society was prepared
to honor,9 5 stating that the mere fact that an individual
has taken measures to restrict certain views of his activi-
ties does not preclude an officer's observations from a
vantage point "where he has a right to be" which renders
the activities clearly visible.96
The majority observed that its decision was consistent
with Justice Harlan's warning in Katz that the fourth
amendment should not be limited to curtailing physical
invasions of private property.9 7 The Court stated that an
aircraft could hardly be placed in the category of future
"electronic" developments that, in 1967, Justice Harlan
feared might "stealthily intrude upon an individual's pri-
92 Id. at 213. ("That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police
observation. The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been ex-
tended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a
home on public thoroughfares.").
93 Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
Id.; see 49 U.S.C. app. § 1301(29) (1988) ("navigable airspace [is] airspace
above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations issued under this
chapter"); 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1990) (fixed-wing aircraft must be operated at an
altitude of at least 1000 feet above obstacles when flying in congested areas and
500 feet above surface in other areas).
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214.
9 Id. at 213. In a footnote, the Court did suggest, however, that it might reach
a contrary decision if the police had been using a sense-enhancing device, stating,
"The State acknowledges that '[a]erial observation of curtilage may become inva-
sive, either due to physical intrusiveness or through modern technology which
discloses to the senses those intimate associations, objects or activities otherwise
imperceptible to police or fellow citizens.' " Id. at 215 n.3.
97 Id. at 214; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 361-62 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Reasonable
expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical
invasion.").
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vacy." 98 While a person who enters a telephone booth is
entitled to assume that his conversation will be private,
the Court noted that a person growing illegal drugs in his
backyard is not similarly entitled to expect that his actions
will go unobserved. 99
Once again, Justice Powell wrote a vigorous dissent.
He noted that the majority's decision appeared to "rest
entirely on the fact that members of the public fly in
planes and may look down at homes as they fly over
them."' 0 0 Attacking the majority's view that this fact ne-
gates any expectations of privacy from purposeful aerial
surveillance by police officers, Powell stated:
[T]he actual risk to privacy from commercial or pleasure
aircraft is virtually nonexistent. Travelers on commercial
flights, as well as private planes used for business or per-
sonal reasons, normally obtain at most a fleeting, anony-
mous, and nondiscriminating glimpse of the landscape
and buildings over which they pass. The risk that a pas-
senger on such a plane might observe private activities,
and might connect those activities with particular people,
is simply too trivial to protect against. It is no accident
that, as a matter of common experience, many people
build fences around their residential areas, but few build
roofs over their backyards. Therefore, contrary to the
Court's suggestion, people do not "knowingly expos[e]"
their residential yards "to the public" merely by failing to
build barriers that prevent aerial surveillance.' 0 '
Powell argued that the majority failed to recognize the
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
Id. at 214-15. The Court failed to consider whether one who did not grow
illicit drugs, but rather engaged in perfectly legal intimate activities in his back-
yard was entitled to any expectation of privacy. One commentator noted, "By
failing to provide even a considered evaluation of the competing interests in law
enforcement and personal privacy, the Chief Justice failed to honestly consider
the social consequences of his pronouncement." Gutterman, supra note 14, at
713.
- Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Court's holding ...
must rest solely on the fact that members of the public fly in planes and may look
down at homes as they fly over them. The Court does not explain why it finds this
fact to be significant." (citation omitted)).
lo, Id. at 223-24 (footnote and citations omitted).
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qualitative difference between police surveillance and
other uses made of the airspace. 0 2 Noting that aerial sur-
veillance presented far too serious a threat to privacy in-
terests to escape entirely the coverage of the fourth
amendment,10 3 he stated that it was difficult to believe
that society was prepared to force individuals to bear the
risk of this type of warrantless police intrusion into private
lives. 10 4 Finally, he warned that the majority's decision
had serious implications for outdoor family activities, stat-
ing that after Ciraolo, families that wished to remain free
from warrantless surveillance were required to forego the
outdoors and "retreat behind the walls of their
homes."1 05
C. Florida v. Riley
Finally, in Florida v. Riley, 10 6 the Supreme Court held
that an officer's naked eye observation of the interior of a
partially covered greenhouse in a residential backyard
from a helicopter circling at 400 feet did not constitute a
search which implicated the fourth amendment. This
holding rests upon the plurality opinion written by Justice
White and a separate opinion by Justice O'Connor con-
curring in the judgment. Four justices vigorously
dissented.
Riley lived in a mobile home located on five acres of
rural property. The greenhouse was located ten to twenty
-2 Id. at 224 ("Members of the public use the airspace for travel, business, or
pleasure, not for the purpose of observing activities taking place within residential
yards.").
l, Id. at 225.
104 Id. ("Rapidly advancing technology now permits police to conduct surveil-
lance in the home itself, an area where privacy interests are most cherished in our
society, without any physical trespass .... [T]he rule in Katz was designed to pre-
vent silent and unseen invasions of Fourth Amendment privacy rights in a variety
of settings .... ).
0- Id. at 225 n.10 ("The feature of such activities that makes them desirable to
citizens living in a free society, namely, the fact that they occur in the open air and
sunlight, is relied on by the Court as a justification for permitting police to con-
duct warrantless surveillance at will.").
1- 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
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feet behind the home. 10 7 Two sides of the greenhouse
were enclosed, and the remaining sides were obscured
from view by trees, shrubbery, and the mobile home. The
greenhouse was covered with corrugated roofing, but two
panels, comprising about ten percent of the roof area,
were missing.1 0 8 Both buildings were surrounded by a
wire fence, and a "DO NOT ENTER" sign was posted in
front of the mobile home. 10 9
Acting on an anonymous tip that marijuana was being
grown on Riley's property, a police officer went to investi-
gate. Finding that he could not see the contents of the
greenhouse from the road, the officer circled twice over
Riley's property in a helicopter at a height of approxi-
mately 400 feet.110 Through the openings in the roof and
the unenclosed sides of the greenhouse, the officer identi-
fied what he believed to be marijuana. Based upon his
observations, a warrant was obtained to search the green-
house. The police found forty-four marijuana plants in
the greenhouse, and Riley was charged with unlawful pos-
session of marijuana. I'
The Florida Supreme Court held that this surveillance
constituted a search and was an impermissible violation of
Riley's fourth amendment privacy rights." 2 The state
court did not read Ciraolo as sanctioning an unlimited
right to survey residential property from the air."' The
court noted that because of a helicopter's exceptional ma-
neuverability and observational capabilities, helicopter
surveillance posed a substantial risk to privacy." 14




I1 d. at 449.
112 Riley v. State, 511 So.2d 282, 284 (Fla. 1987), rev'd sub nom., Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445 (1989).
- Riley, 511 So.2d at 287 ("We simply cannot dismiss as irrelevant the differ-
ence between a fixed-wing aircraft flying at 1000 feet and a helicopter circling and
hovering at 400 feet so that its occupants can look through an opening in a
roof.").
14 Id.; see People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App. 3d 845, 854, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170, 175
(1986) ("To say any sighting from a helicopter . . . validates a search warrant
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Although Riley may not have had a reasonable expecta-
tion that his property would not be viewed by fixed-
winged aircraft, certainly he did not reasonably expect his
property to be examined by a circling helicopter." 5
Noting that this type of search, if left unrestricted,
would "jeopardize individuals' sense of security," ' " 6 the
court stated that an individual can do little to bar aerial
observation of open areas, even if such areas are within
the curtilage and otherwise entitled to the protection of
the fourth amendment." 17 It argued that society was not
prepared to require individuals to relinquish expectations
of privacy in their backyards simply because they have
failed to take extraordinary steps to prevent aerial obser-
vation. 8  Finally, the court cautioned that the "right to
be let alone" includes not only the right to be free from
surveillance within the confines of the home, but also the
right to enjoy outdoor activities in the privacy of an en-
sanctions a broad range of aerial acrobatics performed in a lawful manner but
admittedly intrusive, such as interminable hovering, a persistent overfly, a treetop
observation, all accompanied by the thrashing of the rotor, the clouds of dust and
the earsplitting din."), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1058 (1987).
Riley, 511 So.2d at 288. The court noted:
We do not believe that the details observed here from the vantage
point of a circling and hovering helicopter could just as easily have
been discerned by any person casually flying over the area in a fixed-
wing aircraft. The possibility of observation of the interior of a
greenhouse by passengers on commercial and private aircraft in the
public airways is extraordinarily remote. . . .Although petitioner
may not have had a legitimate expectation that his greenhouse
would not be viewed from a fixed-wing aircraft flying in navigable
public airspace, we do not find unreasonable his expectation that its
contents would not be examined from a helicopter hovering below
500 feet.
Id. (citation omitted).
11o Id. ("[T]he fourth amendment prohibits police activity which, if left un-
restricted, would jeopardize individuals' sense of security or would too heavily
burden those who wish to guard .. .their privacy."); see also People v. Cook, 41
Cal. 3d 373, 382, 710 P.2d 299, 305, 221 Cal. Rptr. 499, 505, (1985) ("Purposeful
surveillance from the air simply lays open everything and everyone below -
whether marijuana plants, nude sunbathers, or family members relaxing in their
lawn chairs - to minute inspection. The usual steps one might take to protect his
privacy are useless.").
117 Riley, 511 So. 2d at 288.
11 Id. at 288-89.
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closed backyard." 9 Accordingly, the Florida court held
that the surveillance impermissibly invaded Riley's privacy
in violation of the fourth amendment. 120
Once again, the United States Supreme Court reversed
a state court's attempt to place constitutional constraints
on warrantless aerial surveillance. Noting that Ciraolo
controlled this case, the Riley plurality held that since
Riley had left two sides and a portion of the greenhouse's
roof uncovered, he could not have had a reasonable ex-
pectation that his property was protected from aerial ob-
servation by a helicopter flying within navigable airspace
established for fixed-wing aircraft.'12  The plurality stated
that it was immaterial that the search was made from a
helicopter, rather than a fixed-wing aircraft, because pri-
vate and commercial helicopter flight is routine in this
country. ' 22
The plurality also stated that it was irrelevant for fourth
amendment purposes that the helicopter was flying below
the limits of navigable airspace allowed for other air-
craft.12 3 Because helicopters are not bound by those lim-
its, the officers were not flying at an altitude which was
contrary to law or regulation. 124 Any member of the pub-
lic could have flown 400 feet over Riley's property in a
helicopter and observed the greenhouse. 25 The plurality
further noted that the helicopter did not interfere with
19 Id. at 289.
120 Id.
1 Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
122 Id. at 451. The Court noted that all 50 states use a total of 1500 helicopters
in police work. Id. at 450 n.2 (citing E. BROWN, THE HELICOPTER IN CIVIL OPERA-
TIONs 79 (1981)). Additionally, there are over 10,000 registered helicopters, both
public and private, in the United States, and more than 31,000 helicopter pilots.
Id. (citing several Federal Aviation Administration reports).
123 Id. at 451; see 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1990).
124 Riley, 488 U.S. at 451; see 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(d) (1990) ("Helicopters may be
operated at less than the minimums prescribed in ... this section if the operation
is conducted without hazard to persons or property on the surface.").
125 Riley, 488 U.S. at 451 ("[T]here is nothing in the record or before us to
suggest that helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare in this country to
lend substance to respondent's claim that he reasonably anticipated that his
greenhouse would not be subject to observation from that altitude.").
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Riley's normal use of his property, that no "intimate de-
tails" associated with the use of his home or curtilage
were observed, and that there was no evidence of exces-
sive noise, wind, dust, or threat of injury. 126 Accordingly,
the plurality held that there was no violation of the fourth
amendment. 2 7
Concurring in the judgment, Justice O'Connor agreed
that the surveillance did not violate an expectation of pri-
vacy that society would recognize as reasonable. 28 She
observed, however, that the plurality's approach rested
too heavily on compliance with FAA safety regulations. 29
She stated that there is no reason to assume that compli-
ance with FAA regulations alone determines whether the
government has infringed the rights and values protected
by the fourth amendment. 30 The mere fact that a heli-
copter can observe the curtilage from virtually any alti-
tude or angle without violating FAA regulations cannot in
itself establish that an individual has no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy from such observations. 3 1
The central inquiry in determining whether Riley had a
reasonable expectation of privacy was not whether the he-
licopter was operating where it had a "right to be," but
whether public helicopter travel at an altitude of 400 feet
was a sufficiently routine part of life that it was unreasona-
ble for Riley to expect his curtilage to be free from such
observation. 32 Because Justice O'Connor believed that
there was considerable public use of the airspace at alti-
12 Id. at 452; see California v. Sabo, 481 U.S. 1088 (1987) (White, J., dissenting)
("It is certainly possible that helicopter surveillance could be unreasonably intru-
sive on account of interminable hovering, raising clouds of dust, creating unrea-
sonable noise, and so forth.").
27 Riley, 488 U.S. at 452.
6 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129 Id.
,o Id. at 453 ("Because the FAA has decided that helicopters can lawfully oper-
ate at virtually any altitude so long as they pose no safety hazard, it does not
follow that the expectations of privacy 'society is prepared to recognize as "rea-
sonable"' simply mirror the FAA's safety concerns.").
1I Id.
'12 Id. at 454. O'Connor noted, "If the public rarely, if ever, travels overhead at
such altitudes, the observation cannot be said to be from a vantage point generally
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tudes of 400 feet and above, she concluded that Riley's
expectation of privacy in this case was unreasonable.1 3
She cautioned, however, that public use of altitudes lower
than 400 feet may be sufficiently rare that police surveil-
lance at such altitudes would violate reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy, despite compliance with FAA
regulations. 3 4
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Ste-
vens, penned a long and scathing dissent. Brennan ar-
gued that by summarily concluding that Riley's
expectation of privacy was unreasonable because any
member of the public could legally have observed his
greenhouse from the air, the plurality failed to address
the critical issue, namely whether low-level helicopter sur-
veillance was consistent with the "aims of a free and open
society." 135
Brennan conceded that what a person knowingly ex-
poses to public view is not a proper subject of fourth
amendment protection.- 6  He disagreed, however, that
Riley's greenhouse was knowingly exposed to the public
simply because a helicopter could conceivably fly over it
without breaking the law.' 37 Brennan wrote:
used by the public and Riley cannot be said to have 'knowingly expose[d]' his
greenhouse to public view." Id. at 455.
133 Id.
'34 Id.
Id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan argued that a determination of
whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable depends upon the question of
"whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permit-
ted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and free-
dom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the
aims of a free and open society.' " Id. (quoting Amersterdam, supra note 8, at
413).
136 Id. at 457; see Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
137 Riley, 488 U.S. at 457. Brennan added:
Notwithstanding the plurality's statistics about the number of heli-
copters registered in this country, can it seriously be questioned that
Riley enjoyed virtually complete privacy in his backyard greenhouse,
and that that privacy was invaded solely by police helicopter surveil-
lance? Is the theoretical possibility that any member of the public
(with sufficient means) could also have hired a helicopter and looked
over Riley's fence of any relevance at all in determining whether
Riley suffered a serious loss of privacy ... ?
7431991]
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Under the plurality's exceedingly grudging Fourth
Amendment theory, the expectation of privacy is defeated
if a single member of the public could conceivably posi-
tion herself to see into the area in question without doing
anything illegal. It is defeated whatever the difficulty a
person would have in so positioning herself, and however
infrequently anyone would in fact do so. In taking this
view the plurality ignores the very essence of Katz. The
reason why there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in an area that is exposed to the public is that little diminu-
tion in "the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to
citizens" will result from police surveillance of something
that any passerby readily sees. To pretend, as the plurality
opinion does, that the same is true when the police use a
helicopter to peer over high fences is, at best,
disingenuous. 138
Brennan attacked the plurality for basing its decision
upon the fact that, under FAA regulations, the officer ob-
served Riley's property from a vantage point where he
had a right to be.' 39 He noted that the plurality was at-
tempting to equate aerial surveillance to surveillance by
an officer who stood on a public road and viewed evidence
through a gap in a fence or an open window.t 40 Brennan
asserted, however, that there was a fundamental differ-
ence between those two types of searches. Unlike surveil-
lance from a public road, helicopter surveillance depends
upon sophisticated and expensive machinery to which few
Id.
lS8 Id,
Id. at 458 ("It is a curious notion that the reach of the Fourth Amendment
can be so largely defined by administrative regulations issued for purposes of
flight safety."). Noting that FAA regulations state that helicopters may be oper-
ated below 500 feet, while fixed-wing aircraft may not, Brennan wrote, "There-
fore, whether Riley's expectation of privacy is reasonable turns on whether the
police officer at 400 feet above his curtilage is seated in an airplane or a helicop-
ter. This cannot be the law." Id. at 458-59 n.2; see 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (1990); see
also State v. Davis, 51 Or. App. 827, 831, 627 P.2d 492, 494 (1981) ("We... find
little attraction in the idea of using FAA regulations because they were not formu-
lated for the purpose of defining the reasonableness of citizens' expectations of
privacy. They were designed to promote air safety.").
14o Riley, 488 U.S. at 459.
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citizens have access.' 4' By ignoring the frequency of pub-
lic aerial surveillance of Riley's curtilage and focusing on
the fact that the police were where they had a right to be,
Brennan felt that the plurality upheld the search simply
because it was "not impossible."'' 42 Such a holding, Bren-
nan stated, was "most emphatically not the same" as de-
termining that Riley's expectation of privacy was not one
that society was prepared to recognize as reasonable. 43
He asserted that it made no more sense to rely upon the
officer's position in the skies in this case than it would to
rely upon the officer's position outside the telephone
booth in Katz.' 44
Brennan was also concerned that there were no mean-
ingful limits to the plurality's holding. Because the FAA
has set no minimum altitude for helicopters, an officer sit-
ting in a helicopter "has a right to be" virtually any-
where.' 45  Brennan felt that there was nothing in the
plurality opinion to suggest that a different rule might ap-
ply if the police had used the helicopter to look into
Riley's home through a window accessible only from the
air, rather than into his garden. 4 6 While conceding that
the plurality noted that the case might have been different
if intimate activities had been observed or if the helicopter
had caused excess noise, wind, or dust, Brennan re-
sponded that if advancements in technology allowed heli-
copters to hover without excess noise, wind, or dust, the
police would then be able to hover just above an enclosed
patio and discover "not only what crops people were
growing in their greenhouse but also what books they
were reading and who their dinner guests were," without
141 Id. at 460.
142 Id.
143 Id. ("To say that an invasion of Riley's privacy from the skies was not impos-
sible is most emphatically not the same as saying that his expectation of privacy
within his enclosed curtilage was not 'one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.' ") (footnote and citation omitted)).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 461.
146 Id. at 463.
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violating any reasonable expectations of privacy. 147
Finally, Brennan criticized the plurality for allowing its
distaste for the activity in which Riley was engaged to
color its analysis of constitutional privacy rights.' 4 He ar-
gued that if we dismiss Riley as a "drug case," we do so
"only at the peril of our own liberties."'' 49 The principle
laid down in this case does not apply only to criminals, it
applies to the aerial observation of any person, for any
reason. 150  Brennan concluded by citing Professor Am-
sterdam for the proposition that the ultimate question is
not whether we must draw the blinds before committing a
crime; "[i]t is whether you and I must discipline ourselves
to draw the blinds every time we enter the room, under
pain of surveillance if we do not."'5'
IV. HAS KATZ BEEN ABANDONED IN THE CONTEXT OF
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE?
Civilization is the progress toward a society of privacy.
The savage's whole existence is public, ruled by the laws
of his tribe. Civilization is the process of setting man free
from men. 152
147 Id. at 462. Brennan also attacked the theoretical underpinnings of the plu-
rality's purported limitations, stating, "If through noise, wind, dust, and threat of
injury from helicopters the state 'interfered with respondent's normal use of the
greenhouse or of other parts of the curtilage,' Riley might have a cause of action
for inverse condemnation, but that is not what the Fourth Amendment is all
about." Id. at 461-62. With respect to the limitation based on observing "inti-
mate" activities, Brennan observed, "Where in the Fourth Amendment or in our
cases is there any warrant for imposing a requirement that the activity observed
must be 'intimate' in order to be protected by the Constitution?" Id. at 463.
148 Id. ("It is indeed easy to forget, especially in view of current concern over
drug trafficking, that the scope of the Fourth Amendment's protection does not
turn on whether the activity disclosed by a search is illegal or innocuous."); see
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have fre-
quently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.").
,49 Rily, 488 U.S. at 463.
'- Id. ("If the Constitution does not protect Riley's marijuana garden against
such surveillance, it is hard to see how it will forbid the Government from aerial
spying on the activities of a law abiding citizen on her fully enclosed outdoor
patio.").
-1 Id. at 464 (quoting Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 403).
"5 A. RAND, THE FOUNTAINHEAD (1943).
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An American has no sense of privacy. He does not
know what it means. There is no such thing in the
country. 5 3
The Supreme Court's aerial surveillance decisions sug-
gest that the Court has returned to a mechanistic, tres-
pass-based approach in deciding fourth amendment
cases. One author looked at Olmstead and Ciraolo and sug-
gested that the Court has come "full circle."'15 4 In both
cases, a court determined to aid law enforcement held
that new forms of law enforcement did not fit within the
protections of the fourth amendment.' 55 The decisions of
the current Supreme Court, however, are perhaps more
dangerous. While the Olmstead decision rested upon a
separate trespass theory which was fundamentally incon-
sistent with the value-based approach of Boyd, and which
was easily discarded in Katz, the current decisions rest
upon a manipulation of the privacy-based approach which
was at the heart of Boyd and Katz. The Court's constricted
view of reasonable expectations of privacy allows techno-
logical advances to diminish fourth amendment protec-
tions.' 56 Privacy rights which are discarded or ignored by
one court may be resurrected by a later one; privacy rights
which are slowly diluted may simply slip away.
This section will examine two significant questions
raised by the Court's aerial surveillance decisions: (1)
Speech by George Bernard Shaw, New York City (Apr. 11, 1933).
', See Gutterman, supra note 14, at 731.
155 Gutterman noted:
The burden of law enforcement, determined Justice Taft, was too
great to protect the " 'liberty of one's communication"; enter the
trespass doctrine as the sole limitation on government activity. Dur-
ing the Warren Court era, the concern that modern technology in-
hibited conversational privacy produced a sharper focus on privacy
rights; center-stage the Katz era and its rejection of Olmstead. To-
day's Court, once again wishing to help law enforcement, relies on
the plain language of the Constitution, to hold that.., aerial surveil-
lance of private areas not accompanied by a physical trespass is not
unreasonable.
Id. at 731-32 (footnotes omitted).
,- See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 251 n.13 (1986) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
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whether the Court can meaningfully draw the line be-
tween reasonable and unreasonable searches conducted
with advanced technology; and (2) whether the possibility
of inadvertent violations of privacy rights by private indi-
viduals justifies intentional infringement of those rights
by governmental officials.
A. Where Will the Court Draw the Line?
Imagine a helicopter hovering inches above the ground,
its occupants using an infrared telescope to peer through
a window into a darkened bedroom. Would this activity
violate the fourth amendment? In Riley, the Court held
that the naked eye observation of the curtilage by an of-
ficer circling 400 feet above ground did not constitute a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. But
what about a helicopter circling at one hundred feet, or
fifty feet, or two feet? Or what if the officers had not been
examining the property with their naked eyes, but had
been using binoculars, or a sophisticated mapping cam-
era, or an infrared telescope? At what point, if any, would
the Court step in and hold that the officers had violated
fourth amendment rights?
1. Minimum Altitude
There is little in the Riley plurality opinion to suggest
that 400 feet is a necessary lower limit for helicopter sur-
veillance. The Riley plurality emphasized that the helicop-
ter in that case had fully complied with applicable FAA
regulations.'5 7 Because these regulations allow helicop-
ters to hover even inches off the ground as long as the
aircraft is operated without hazard to persons or prop-
erty, 58 police officers circling at any altitude can be cer-
tain that they are hovering where they have "a right to
be."1 5
9
1-17 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989).
,so See 14 C.F.R. § 91.79(d) (1990).
'-.q See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). In his dissenting opinion in Riley,Jus-
tice Brennan stated:
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The plurality did note, however, that an inspection of
the curtilage from an aircraft will not always pass muster
under the fourth amendment "simply because the plane is
within the navigable airspace specified by law."' 6 ° At the
conclusion of its opinion, the Court suggested that the
presence of the following may give rise to a fourth amend-
ment violation: (1) evidence that helicopters flying at the
altitude in question are sufficiently rare so as to lend sub-
stance to an expectation of privacy, (2) observation of inti-
mate details connected with the use of the home or
curtilage, and (3) undue noise, wind, dust, or threat of in-
jury.16 1 Whether these limitations have any teeth is, of
course, an open question. Certainly they provide little
guidance in developing a bright line minimum altitude
standard. Nevertheless, they could be used to invalidate
future searches which offend the sensibilities of a majority
of the Court.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion suggests, how-
ever, that 400 feet may be the minimum altitude at which
helicopter surveillance will be tolerated. O'Connor wrote
that because there is reason to believe that there is consid-
erable public use of airspace at altitudes of 400 feet and
above, Riley's expectation of privacy from naked-eye ae-
rial observation at that altitude was not reasonable.162 Be-
cause public use of altitudes lower than 400 feet may be
quite rare, however, police surveillance from such alti-
tudes may violate reasonable expectations of privacy, de-
spite compliance with FAA air safety regulations.163 With
the passage of time, and the inevitable shift in the Court's
It is worth reiterating that the FAA regulations the plurality relies on
as establishing that the officer was where he had a right to be set no
minimum flight altitude for helicopters. It is difficult, therefore, to
see what, if any, helicopter surveillance would run afoul of the plu-
rality's rule that there exists no reasonable expectation of privacy as
long as the helicopter is where it has a right to be.
Riley, 488 U.S. at 461 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
- Riley, 488 U.S. at 451.
161 Id.
1 2 Id. at 455 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
163 Id.
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makeup, it remains to be seen whether this proposed limi-
tation will prevail. Justice Brennan noted that while Jus-
tice O'Connor's opinion gives reason to hope that 400
feet may constitute a lower limit, there is considerable
cause for concern in the fact that a plurality of the Court
would remove virtually all constitutional barriers to police
surveillance from the vantage point of circling
helicopters. 1,"
2. Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices
A troubling question also arises with respect to the use
of sense-enhancing devices in the aerial surveillance of
the curtilage. Such devices unquestionably increase the
potency and intrusiveness of aerial observations. 65 Riley
and Ciraolo involved only naked eye surveillance; Dow per-
mitted the use of sense-enhancing devices, but in the con-
text of open fields. The use of sense-enhancing devices to
view the curtilage from the air has not been litigated in
the Supreme Court. The Court has, however, addressed
the more general question of whether sense-enhancing
devices can be used in conjunction with visual surveillance
to monitor activities within a home.
In United States v. Knotts,16 6 police officers placed an elec-
tronic tracking beeper in a container of chemicals that
they believed were to be used in the manufacture of illegal
drugs. Thereafter, the officers traced the beeper signals
to the defendant's home, where they discovered a drug
laboratory. 167 The Court held that monitoring the beeper
signals did not violate a legitimate expectation of privacy
because the beeper did not reveal any activity which could
- Id. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas,J., dissenting)
(high-tech surveillance may be "the greatest leveler of human privacy ever
known"); Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitutional Analysis, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 404, 427 (1982). See generally Comment, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: Search-
ingfor Constitutional Standards, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 257, 297-300 (1986).
1- 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
167 Id. at 278.
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not have been detected by means of visual surveillance. 61 s
The fact that the officers relied on electronic assistance as
well as visual observation did not alter the constitutional
analysis, according to the Court. The Court stated that
nothing in the fourth amendment prohibited the police
from augmenting their senses with such enhancements as
science and technology afforded them.1 69
The Knotts Court noted that there was no indication that
the beeper was used to reveal any information concerning
activities within the defendant's home which would not
have been visible to the naked eye from outside the
home, 70 but it did not indicate whether such surveillance
would violate the fourth amendment. In United States v.
Karo,171 however, the Court squarely addressed this issue
and held that monitoring a beeper in a private residence
violates a legitimate expectation of privacy. Thus, the
Supreme Court has apparently indicated that the use of
technology to enhance visual surveillance should stop at
the entrance to the home. Lower courts have reached
similar conclusions. While enhanced visual observation
of the curtilage generally does not violate a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, 72 enhanced observation of the
home's interior does violate the fourth amendment. 7 3
1- Id. at 282.
,69 Id.; cf. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (use of flashlight to illumi-
nate interior of respondent's open barn located outside of curtilage did not trans-
form officers' observations into unreasonable search within meaning of fourth
amendment); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927) (Coast Guard's use of
searchlight at night to see aboard a schooner did not constitute a search under
fourth amendment).
17o Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
172 See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 703 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1983) (use of night
scope without a warrant to identify defendant standing outside of barn was per-
missible); United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 854
(1982) (use of binoculars and spotting scope to view activities within the curtilage
upheld under open fields doctrine); United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706 (5th
Cir. 1970) (binocular-aided observation of curtilage from open field is not a
search). But see United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987)
(continuous warrantless video surveillance of defendant's curtilage for thirty-day
period with camera mounted on utility pole overlooking defendant's property vio-
lated fourth amendment).
173 See, e.g., United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1980) ("any
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This is true even though observations of a home's interior
with the naked eye are generally upheld.1 74 Given these
precedents, it appears likely that the Supreme Court will
not allow aerial observers to use sense-enhancing devices
to peer into people's homes and detect activities that they
could not see with their naked eyes.' 75 At least for com-
monly available devices, however, similar limitations with
respect to the curtilage appear unlikely. 76
The Court's aerial surveillance cases shed little light on
this issue. While the Court in Ciraolo acknowledged that
aerial surveillance of the curtilage may become invasive if
modern technology discloses intimate activities which
would be otherwise imperceptible to police or members
of the public, 77 in Dow, the Court focused not on the in-
enhanced viewing of the interior of a home impair[s] a legitimate expectation of
privacy"); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976) (enhanced
observation of interior of defendant's apartment held to violate reasonable expec-
tation of privacy).
174 See, e.g., United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585 (11 th Cir. 1986) (no reason-
able expectation of privacy as to basement of home which could be viewed with
naked eye from neighboring property or adjoining canal), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1055 (1987); Taborda, 635 F.2d at 139 (use of"unenhanced vision from a location
where the observer may properly be does not impair a legitimate expectation of
privacy"); Kim, 415 F. Supp. at 1255 (suggesting that warrantless observation into
a home without "artificial amplification devices" does not violate fourth amend-
ment). See generally, Power, Technology and the Fourth Amendment: A Proposed Formula-
tion for Visual Searches, 80J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 38-42 (1989).
175 See supra notes 171-174 and accompanying text.
176 See supra note 172 and accompanying discussion. The Fifth Circuit decision
in Cuevas-Sanchez, however, indicates that there should be some limitations to en-
hanced observation of the curtilage. While limited observation of the curtilage
with binoculars and night scopes may not raise any constitutional problems, see
supra note 172, continuous observation of the curtilage with a mounted video cam-
era violates a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at
251 ("It does not follow that Ciraolo authorizes any type of surveillance whatever
just because one type of minimally-intrusive aerial observation is possible.").
,77 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 n.3; Riley, 488 U.S. at 452 (in upholding helicopter
surveillance of curtilage, plurality noted that "no intimate details ... were ob-
served"). In Riley,Justice Brennan attacked the nebulous quality of this standard,
stating, "What, one wonders, is meant by 'intimate details'? If the police had ob-
served Riley embracing his wife in the backyard greenhouse, would we then say
that his reasonable expectation of privacy had been infringed?" Riley, 488 U.S. at
463 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan argued that nowhere does the fourth
amendment or Supreme Court case law require an activity to be "intimate" in
order to be constitutionally protected. Id.
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fringed privacy rights but on the complexity and availabil-
ity of the technology used. 178  These cryptic
pronouncements give rise to two additional, but rather
tentative, conclusions. First, with respect to open fields,
as long as technology is commercially available, even if it
is expensive and highly sophisticated, the fourth amend-
ment will not be implicated. 179 Second, the only addi-
tional constraint on enhanced surveillance of the curtilage
appears to be a prohibition on the observation of "inti-
mate activities."180
Whether this second limitation has any teeth remains to
be seen. If not, then the curtilage may be fully subject to
the troubling Dow standard, whose indefinite technologi-
cal distinctions make it difficult to determine whether a
particular technique currently is in or out of the fourth
amendment's ambit. 181 In that case, the critical issue in
determining whether sense-enhancing devices may be
used to view the curtilage may not be where the Court will
draw the line, but whether a stationary line can be drawn
at all.
B. Do Inadvertent Private Acts Justify Intentional
Governmental Acts?
In Ciraolo, the majority upheld aerial surveillance of the
defendant's curtilage because any member of the public
flying overhead could have glanced down and inadver-
tently observed Ciraolo's garden. 8 2 The Court cited Katz
for the proposition that "[w]hat a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
178 See Dow, 476 U.S. at 231. The Dow Court, however, did note that it was
important that Dow's facility was not "an area immediately adjacent to a private
home, where privacy expectations are most heightened." Dow, 476 U.S. at 237
n.4. It is indeed possible, then, that the Court will prohibit all enhanced aerial
observation of the curtilage. Language from Ciraolo and Riley suggests, however,
that the Court will allow enhanced surveillance as long as no "intimate" activities
are observed. See supra note 177.
179 See Dow, 476 U.S. at 231.
- See supra note 177 and accompanying discussion.
'' Gutterman, supra note 14, at 720.
182 See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
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a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."1 81 Such an
analysis distorts the holding in Katz and undermines the
principal values protected by the fourth amendment."8 4
The Court has taken the "knowingly exposes to the
public" language from the Katz majority opinion and ele-
vated it to a talisman to hold that any activity exposed to
the public is not worthy of fourth amendment protection,
even if exposure is limited or unlikely. 8 5 By equating the
risk to privacy that is posed by the inadvertent glance of a
private airline passenger with the purposeful surveillance
of government officials, the Court has ignored the qualita-
tive difference between the two and has drastically altered
the nature of the risks we assume. As Justice Powell
noted, the actual risk to privacy from privately operated
aircraft is virtually nonexistent.18 6  When a person
barbecues or sunbathes in his backyard, he generally ex-
pects to conduct these activities with some level of pri-
vacy. Knowledge of the possibility that a commercial jet
will fly overhead and allow its passengers a fleeting
glimpse of his activities is unlikely to alter this expecta-
tion.8 7  Nevertheless, the Court has used this minimal
risk to justify intentional government surveillance. 88
- Id. at 213, (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
,84 See, Serr, supra note 48, at 598 ("This analysis, although perhaps commenda-
ble for its simplicity, begs the constitutional question and undercuts the spirit of
both Katz and the fourth amendment.").
18s Id. at 597-98.
186 See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223-24 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[T]he actual risk to
privacy from commercial or pleasure aircraft is virtually nonexistent. Travelers on
commercial flights, as well as private planes used for business or personal reasons,
normally obtain at most a fleeting, anonymous and nondiscriminating glimpse of
the landscape and buildings over which they pass."); see also Comment, A Privacy-
Based Analysis for Warrantless Aerial Surveillance Cases, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1799
(1987).
187 See Comment, supra note 186, at 1799. ("When a person barbecues or gar-
dens in his backyard, he does not contemplate that overhead aircraft are disclos-
ing to the public the intimate details of his activities. Quite the opposite, he may
reasonably expect to conduct his activities in comfortable privacy. This reason-
able expectation arises because, in fact, such indiscreet observations are not
made.").
188 Professor Serr stated:
[E]ven after conceding that the individuals in Ciraolo and Greenwood
manifested subjective privacy expectations by fencing their back-
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Moreover, by focusing upon the "public exposure" lan-
guage from Katz, the Court ignores a more fundamental
principle embodied in that opinion, namely that what a
person "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area ac-
cessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected."18s9 The Katz Court certainly "did not make
private conversations fair game for government surveil-
lance on [the] theory that any member of the public may
have walked past the public telephone booth and over-
heard Katz's conversation.' 90 Rather, Katz held that the
guarantees of the fourth amendment may be implicated
whenever the effect of government activity is to gain ac-
cess to protected information.' 9' Whatever the Supreme
Court meant by the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test formulated in Katz, it surely did not anticipate that it
would be twisted around and used to mandate almost to-
tal security against public disclosure before fourth amend-
yards and putting their trash in sealed, opaque containers, the Court
used its Katz talisman to rule such expectations societally illegiti-
mate. According to the Court, thoseprivacy expectations were ille-
gitimate because individuals flying in commercial jets overhead might
see into an unroofed backyard, or scavengers might open and rum-
mage through garbage bags. In this way, the Court undercuts both
the letter and the spirit of Katz ....
Serr, supra note 48, at 625; see California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)
(fourth amendment does not prohibit warrantless search of garbage left outside
curtilage of home). Despite the fact that the garbage in Greenwood was contained
in a closed, opaque container, the Court held that no reasonable expectation of
privacy attached to the garbage because "[iut is common knowledge that plastic
garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to ani-
mals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." Id. at 40.
(footnotes and citations omitted). Professor LaFave has also argued that privacy
is not an "all or nothing" commodity. "[T]here is a dramatic difference between
revealing bits and pieces of information sporadically to a small and often select
group for a limited purpose and focused police examination of the totality of that
information regarding a particular individual." LaFave, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta
Principiis in Fourth AmendmentJurisprudence, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 291, 304 (1986).
189 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
-~ Gutterman, supra note 14, at 728.
19, Id. at 725 ("Katz rejected a location theory regarding fourth amendment
coverage. It should have been clear that after Katz no easy generalization was
going to be possible regarding visual observation of private activity, not even
those made from a vantage point where the officer had a lawful right to be.").
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ment protection attaches. 92
Katz was entitled to fourth amendment protection be-
cause he entered a public telephone booth and closed the
door behind him.193 He was not required to check the
booth for cracks through which his words might escape or
to speak in hushed tones so that a person standing near
the booth could not hear him. He expected his conversa-
tion to remain private, and this expectation was recog-
nized as legitimate, notwithstanding the fact that someone
conceivably could have heard him. Likewise, in Riley and
Ciraolo, individuals went to great lengths to prevent
ground-based observation. 94 Unquestionably, both men
maintained a subjective expectation of privacy from un-
wanted surveillance. They did fail to adequately protect
against aerial observation; however, because a chance
overflight would give a member of the public only a fleet-
ing glimpse of the property, the risk of public exposure
was rather low. A passenger in an aircraft flying over
Riley's property was likely to see no more than a motorist
driving by Katz's phone booth was likely to hear. To ig-
nore this reality is disingenuous. 95
At least one commentator has suggested that Katz itself
would be decided differently under the principles laid
down by the Court in cases such as Riley, Ciraolo, and
Greenwood.' 96 The argument is that because somebody
might have overheard Katz's conversation, he did not have
a legitimate expectation of privacy. 197 Perhaps, but be-
cause Katz spoke in an enclosed booth, he probably did
not "knowingly expose" his conversation to the public.' 98
On the other hand, Katz might well be decided differently
today if Katz had left the door open or used an unen-
closed phone. In that case, even if Katz had spoken in
,92 Power, supra note 174, at 38-39.
ls See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
,94 See Riley, 488 U.S. at 448; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209.
,,s See Riley, 488 U.S. at 460; (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19c, See Serr, supra note 48, at 626.
197 Id.
- Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also Riley, 488 U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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hushed tones, thereby manifesting a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, the mere possibility that somebody might
have heard his exposed conversation would prevent the
Court from recognizing his privacy expectations as legiti-
mate.199 Such a holding would be entirely consistent with
these recent fourth amendment decisions. Nevertheless,
it departs from the true spirit of Katz.20 0
The ultimate question requires a value judgment. As
Professor Amsterdam noted, the central issue is "how
tightly the fourth amendment permits people to be driven
back into the recesses of their lives by the risk of surveil-
lance."'2 0' By forcing citizens to bear the risk of warrant-
less aerial surveillance, the Court has failed to consider
the risks to our society inherent in such a blanket authori-
zation of police activity. Unrestrained, law enforcement
officials are free to develop surveillance techniques which
are increasingly oppressive, gradually eroding our expec-
tations of privacy. The fourth amendment, however, is
designed to curb overly zealous law enforcement. The
Court has a duty to regulate the use of any surveillance
method which diminishes the amount of freedom and pri-
vacy remaining to citizens to "a compass inconsistent with
the aims of a free and open society. ' 20 2 To do less than
'- Courts have generally held that a person speaking loudly enough to be
heard with the naked ear has assumed the risk of being overheard. See, e.g., United
States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 98-100 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980)
(upholding naked-ear eavesdropping of motel room conversation by agent in
common hallway); United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1051-55 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979) (no justifiable expectation of privacy concerning
hotel room conversation overhead by agent with naked ear).
2- See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("[w]hat [a person] ... seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.").
201 Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 402.
202 Id. at 403 (The key question "is whether, if the particular form of surveil-
lance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional re-
straints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be
diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society.").
Professor Gutterman argued:
Knowledge that our private activities are under systematic observa-
tion destroys the sense of security and freedom the fourth amend-
ment seeks to protect. Once these surveillance techniques are
approved and accepted in a democratic society, their result will cer-
tainly be to lower all our privacy expectations. The meaning of the
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this is to ignore the fundamental values expressed in Boyd
and Katz. 03
On the other hand, it may be argued that Riley and
Ciraolo are not particularly disturbing because they pose
no real threat to innocent homeowners. °4 It is certainly
true that both Riley and Ciraolo were guilty of violating
state drug laws. Perhaps they did in fact deserve the treat-
ment they received. 20 5  Nevertheless, the fourth amend-
ment does not distinguish between the innocent and the
guilty, and it should not be forgotten that the "safeguards
of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies in-
volving not very nice people. '2 0 6  Unless the fourth
fourth amendment will have been significantly altered, indicating
that its freedoms are to be tacitly marked as secondary rights, .and
thus relegated to a deferred position.
Gutterman, supra note 14, at 733-34 (footnotes omitted).
20 Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 402. Professor Amsterdam noted:
Mr. Katz could, of course, have protected himself against surveil-
lance by forebearing to use the phone; and... anyone can protect
himself against surveillance by retiring to the cellar, cloaking all the
windows with thick caulking, turning off the lights and remaining
absolutely quiet. This much withdrawal is not required in order to
obtain the benefit of the amendment because, if it were, the amend-
ment's benefit would be too stingy to preserve the kind of open soci-
ety to which the amendment is supposed to function.ld.
.204 Gutterman, supra note 14, at 718 (To some, "only the guilty are threatened
when the police fly over a private residence to observe and photograph illegally
grown marijuana plants.").
205 Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 402-03 ("[I]t is natural enough to [say] ... that
anyone who commits a crime or leaves criminal evidence lying around in front of
an open window deserves exactly what he gets. Let him at least have the decency
to draw the shade before he commits a crime.").
26 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing); see Riley, 488 U.S. at 463 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is indeed easy
to forget, especially in view of current concern over drug trafficking that the scope
of the Fourth Amendment's protection does not turn on whether the activity dis-
closed by a search is illegal or innocuous."); White, 401 U.S. at 789 (1971)(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[The Court] does not simply mandate that criminals
must daily run the risk of unknown eavesdroppers prying into their private affairs;
it subjects each and every law-abiding member of society to that risk."); Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[Wiherever a
culprit is caught red-handed, as in leading Fourth Amendment cases, it is difficult
to adopt and enforce a rule that would turn him loose. A rule protective of law-
abiding citizens is not apt to flourish where its advocates are usually criminals.
Yet the rule we fashion is for the innocent and guilty alike."); see alsoJ. LANDYNSKI,
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amendment imposes some sort of limitation on aerial sur-
veillance, police may look into private yards and homes
and "observe a thousand innocent acts for every guilty act
they spy Out."' 20 7 The Constitution does not protect the
right to secretly commit a crime; but it does protect
against unreasonable invasions of privacy rights - rights
which belong to the innocent and guilty alike. In short,
we should dismiss these as "drug cases" "only at the peril
of our own liberties. 20 8
V. CONCLUSION: APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE CASES
By concluding that the warrantless observations in Dow,
Ciraolo, and Riley were not "searches" within the meaning
of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court determined
that the amendment did not even apply in those cases.
The police, therefore, not only did not need to obtain a
search warrant, they did not even have to reasonably sus-
pect that criminal activity was taking place. This article
proposes that the Court recognize that aerial surveillance
involves a "search" and, accordingly, require that officers
obtain a warrant before such observations take place.
The Court's constricted definition of the word "search"
in the context of the fourth amendment is an injustice to
the amendment itself and to the plain meaning of the
English language.2 °9 When an officer circles a person's
home and peers into his windows, to paraphrase Profes-
sor Amsterdam, what on earth is he doing up there but
strained search for smuggled goods that brought the Fourth Amendment into
being.").
207 Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 403.
208 Riley, 488 U.S. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion which sug-
gests that the Supreme Court has indeed fashioned an implicit exception to the
fourth amendment in "drug cases," see Stewart, The Drug Exception, A.B.A.J., May
1990, at 42 (noting that ChiefJustice Burger in 1979 asked one prosecutor during
oral argument whether the case was covered by the "drug exception'.' to the
fourth amendment).
o See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2048 (1986) (defin-
ing "search" as follows: "to look into or over carefully or thoroughly in an effort
to find something").
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searching?21 0 As long as a person has made an effort to
prevent ground-based observation of his property, he has
not "knowingly exposed" himself to the public simply be-
cause he has failed to erect barriers against aerial observa-
tion.2 11 An expectation of privacy need not be complete
and inviolable, it must only be "reasonable." While it is
true that activities may at times be knowingly exposed to
public view, they are not knowingly exposed simply be-
cause it is remotely conceivable that members of the pub-
lic could observe them.21 2 When government officials
ignore this expectation of privacy and scrutinize a per-
son's home from the air, they unquestionably have
"searched" that person's property.
The fourth amendment, however, does not prohibit all
searches, only those that are "unreasonable. ' 21 3 The crit-
ical fourth amendment inquiry thus should not be
whether a particular observation constitutes a search, but
whether that search was reasonable under the circum-
stances. Undoubtedly, the best protection against an un-
reasonable search is provided by the issuance of a warrant
by a detached and neutral magistrate. 1 4 As a result, in
most cases, searches conducted without a warrant are per
21o See Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 396 ("When the policeman shines his flash-
light in the parked car or listens at the tenement door, what else is he doing than
searching? When he climbs up a telephone pole and peers beneath a second-
story window shade, what on earth is he doing up that pole but searching?").
211 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 224 (1986) (Powell, J. dissenting)
"[p]eople do not 'knowingly expos[e]' their residential yards 'to the public'
merely by failing to build barriers that prevent aerial surveillance."); United States
v. Allen, 675 F.2d 1373, 1380 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Comment, supra note 186, at
1795 ("In determining whether a party has a reasonable expectation of privacy
[against aerial surveillance], the central consideration should be the measures
taken to prevent ground-based intrusions.").
212 One commentator has urged the Court to focus on the degree of public
exposure, rather than simply on the fact, or possibility, of exposure. See Serr,
supra note 48, at 632-33. Professor Serr suggests that four questions should be
considered in determining whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable: (1)
how great is the risk of exposure?; (2) how extensive is the exposure?; (3) which
members of the public may observe the activity?; and (4) how closely can mem-
bers of the public view the activity? Id. at 633.
213 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
214 Comment, supra note 165, at 262; see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 532-33 (1967).
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se unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 5 While
the Court has recognized "a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant require-
ment,21 6 generally based upon the exigency of the circum-
stances surrounding the search, aerial searches should not
be added to this list.217
Unlike searches incident to arrest,218 or automobile
searches,21 9 the circumstances surrounding aerial obser-
vations are unlikely to involve either a risk to the safety of
the searching officers or of the imminent disappearance of
criminal evidence. Aerial surveillance typically does not
involve emergency procedures, but does require advance
21- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
216 Id.; see, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325-27 (1987) (upholding war-
rantless seizure of evidence in "plain view," as long as there is probable cause to
believe that item is subject to seizure); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619
(1977) (upholding warrantless routine entry searches along nation's border);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973) (holding that warrant-
less search was reasonable when individual consented to search); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (upholding warrantless search conducted in-
cident to a lawful arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (upholding
warrantless frisk for weapons when officer detains suspect and has reasonable sus-
picion that criminal activity may be afoot); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-
99 (1967) (upholding warrantless search under "exigent circumstances"); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (upholding warrantless open road
search of automobile).
21'7 If, however, a particular form of aerial surveillance falls within one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, that search should perhaps be
upheld. For example, a carefully circumscribed "plain view" exception could ap-
ply to inadvertent glances revealing criminal activity by officers legitimately flying
over a particular piece of property. Cf Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
464-73 (1971). Strict judicial scrutiny would be required to determine whether
the officers had a legitimate reason for being where they were and whether the
glance was truly "inadvertent." See Comment, supra note 186, at 1803. Another
exception might apply to aerial searches made while in "hot pursuit" of criminal
suspects fleeing on the ground. Cf Hayden, 387 U.S. at 310 (Fortas, J., concur-
ring). Any attempt to apply an established exception to the context of aerial sur-
veillance must be carefully scrutinized. As Justice Brennan argued in Riley, a
principle based on terrestrial observation should not be "applied to airborne sur-
veillance without any consideration of whether that [makes] a difference." Riley,
488 U.S. at 458 n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218 Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234 (search incident to arrest is based upon the need to
disarm the suspect for the safety of the officer and others and upon the need to
preserve evidence for use at trial).
219 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 (warrantless search of automobile justified because
vehicle could be moved easily and the evidence destroyed or removed before a
warrant could be obtained).
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decision-making and preparation. Before engaging in ae-
rial observation, officials must initially decide to search a
given location and then prepare an aircraft for this search.
It does not seem unduly burdensome to require that they
also obtain a warrant before the search begins.220
While the imposition of a warrant requirement will un-
doubtedly make the task of law enforcement more diffi-
cult, particularly in attempting to control illegal drug
trafficking, the threat abusive aerial observations pose to
our sense of security mandates the application of the full
force of the fourth amendment. 22' Effective law enforce-
ment is a critical concern and a laudable goal in our soci-
ety, but it is also a goal which cannot be pursued at the
expense of our collective liberty. The scope of our fourth
amendment liberties cannot be made to depend upon the
self-restraint of police officers.222 Rather, zealous law en-
forcement must be controlled by judicial intervention,
"the instrument by which a free society imposes on itself
the seldom welcome, sometimes dangerous, always indis-
pensable restraints that keep it free."' 223 To do less is to
put the guarantees of the fourth amendment squarely in
the hands of those who are most likely to violate the
amendment. As New York's highest court once remarked,
"Duties of law enforcement officials are extremely de-
manding in a free society. But that is as it should be. A
2Vo See Gutterman, supra note 14, at 733.
22. See id. at 732-33 ("The potential for serious privacy invasion is so great that
it may be argued that all government use of sophisticated visual equipment, espe-
cially in combination with aerial surveillance of private property, should be sub-
ject to the warrant requirement.").
222 See United State v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786-87 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing) ("For those more extensive intrusions that significantly jeopardize the sense
of security which is the paramount concern of Fourth Amendment liberties, I am
of the view that more than self-restraint by law enforcement officials is required
and at the least warrants should be necessary.").
223 Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 353. At least one state court apparently agreed.
In State v. Ainsworth, 95 Or. App. 240, .770 P.2d 58 (en banc), review allowed, 308
Or. 158, 776 P.2d 859 (1989), a case decided after Riley, the Oregon Court of
Appeals held that a helicopter fly-over of the defendant's property to search for
marijuana plants violated privacy rights protected by the Oregon Constitution, if
not the U.S. Constitution, because police conducted the search without a warrant.
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policeman's job is easy only in a police state. 22 4
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24 People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77, 82, 315 N.E.2d 792, 795, 358 N.Y.S.2d
743, 748 (1974); see Comment, supra note 165, at 300.

